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IV 
JURISDICTION 
This case is here on this Court's August 9, 2001 grant of Tracey Cannon's and 
Cannon Associates, Inc.'s ("Appellants") Petition for Writ of Certiorari, a copy of which 
is included in the Addendum as Exhibit 1. Appellants seek this Court's review of the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the Final Order of Judgment entered on 
January 11, 2000, by the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Constitution art. VIII, sec. 5, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
When a real estate agent fraudulently induced a listing agreement, and that agent's 
broker brought suit against an innocent defendant to collect a commission based on the 
fraudulently obtained contract, did the Utah Court of Appeals err when it failed to follow 
the rules of law affirmed in this Court's decision in Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 
P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), which require that the agent's knowledge of the fraud be imputed 
to the principal for purposes of showing lack of merit and bad faith? This issue was 
raised to the trial court by way of motion. (R. at 979). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
""On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial 
court."" Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, 416 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah 2001) (quoting 
Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 408 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (quoting Lysenko v. Sawaya, 
2000 UT 58, P15, 7 P.3d 783)). "The court of appeals' decision is reviewed for 
correctness, and its conclusions of law are afforded no deference." Esquivel v. Labor 
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Comm'n, 2000 UT 66, 7 P.3d 777 (Utah 2000) (citing Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall 
1999 UT 33, P4, 978 P.2d 460). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CASES 
The following cases and statutory provisions are deemed controlling and are relied 
upon in this brief: 
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1988) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10(1) (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(2) (1997) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case arises out of a fraud perpetrated by Aries Hansen ("Hansen"), an agent 
of Wardley Better Homes & Garden ("Wardley"), a real estate brokerage and the plaintiff 
in the underlying action. Wardley5 s agent falsified dates in certain real estate listing 
agreements signed by landowners named Mascaro, fraudulently extending the 
agreements' intended term from one (1) day, to a year and a day (366 days). Months 
after the intended one-day listing lapsed, Tracey Cannon, ("Cannon") a real estate broker, 
listed the property and eventually facilitated a sale, earning a commission. Seeking to 
enforce its agent's fraudulent listing agreement, Wardley brought suit against the 
Mascaros and, eventually, Cannon, seeking the commission on Cannon's sale. At the 
conclusion of the litigation, Cannon had been forced to spend over $60,000 in attorneys 
fees defending herself against, and ultimately proving that Wardley's claims were based 
on the fraudulent conduct of its own agent (R. at 996-99). When Cannon sought her 
attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 ("Utah Bad Faith Statute"), the trial 
court denied the motion, ruling that "Wardley" did not act in bad faith in pursuing the 
commission and other claims. This appeal ensued, and the judgment of the trial court 
denying attorneys' fees was affirmed in the panel opinion below. 
B. RELEVANT FACTS: 
1. Because Utah law specifies only a broker may pursue a commission earned 
by an agent, Wardley first brought suit against the Mascaros on November 7, 1994, (R. at 
1), many months after the listing agreements were signed, alleging that Wardley had 
found a ready, willing and able buyer for the Mascaros' property, and that pursuant to the 
listing agreements signed by Hansen, Wardley was entitled to a commission from the 
Mascaros. (R. at 4). 
2. After learning that the Mascaro property had been sold with Cannon's 
assistance, Wardley amended its complaint on August 4, 1995 (R. at 81) to add and bring 
claims against Cannon alleging unlawful interference with contract and civil conspiracy. 
(R. at 87-89). Over a year later, on August 19, 1996, Wardley moved to amend its 
complaint for a second time for the purpose of, among other things, adding three more 
claims against Cannon. (R. at 175-76). Wardley's actions continued to mount against 
Cannon in spite of the fact that Wardley's agent had actual knowledge he had 
fraudulently induced the listing agreements. 
3. Cannon opposed Wardley's motion to file a second amended complaint. 
(R. at 248). Although the trial court eventually allowed Wardley to file a second 
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amended complaint, it expressly cautioned Wardley against bringing claims for which no 
good faith basis existed: 
The Motion to Amend Complaint is granted. It should be 
noted that this Court is not ruling on the viability of any of 
plaintiffs new claims. Plaintiff is urged to very carefully 
assess the facts and law and only file those claims that can be 
brought in good faith after diligent exploration of the facts. 
(R. at 269). See, court's Ruling dated October 9, 1996, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 2 (emphasis added). 
4. Despite the trial court's admonition, and despite its agent's actual 
knowledge of the fraudulently induced listing agreements, Wardley chose to file its 
Second Amended Complaint against Cannon, wherein Wardley alleged that Cannon 
violated the Utah Administrative Code, converted Wardley's property, and intentionally 
interfered with listing agreements executed between Wardley and the Mascaros. (R. at 
278-80). Those claims were premised upon listing agreements assuming a term of 366 
days which, of course, was a false premise known to Wardley's agent. Cannon answered 
and claimed that Wardley should pay attorneys' fees under the Utah Bad Faith Statute. 
5. Trial began on June 8, 1998 and continued through June 11, 1998. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the court ruled from the bench that Wardley had not established a 
cause of action against Cannon under the Utah Administrative Code. (R. at 927). 
Likewise, the court also ruled that Wardley had not met its burden of proof in connection 
with its claim that Cannon interfered with Wardley's prospective economic relations. (R. 
at 927). Finally, the court ruled that Wardley had not met its burden of proof as to its 
claim that Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the Mascaros' 
property to Cannon constituted conversion. (R. at 927). The trial court took the 
remaining issues raised in Wardley's Second Amended Complaint under advisement. (R. 
at 927). 
6. On August 28, 1998, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit 3 (R. at 937). The 
trial court found that Wardley's agent changed and altered dates in the listing agreements 
with the Mascaros. (R. at 943-44). The trial court also found that Wardley's agent, to 
induce the Mascaros to sign the listing agreements, fraudulently represented that the 
listing agreements would be limited to one-party, and would expire in one day. (R. at 
944). Specifically, the trial court found that Wardley's agent "altered the November 15, 
1993, date which was originally found on the first listing agreement and added expiration 
dates to the remaining three listing agreements to reflect an unagreed and unintended 
one-year duration." (R. at 948). The trial court found that Wardley's agent took full 
advantage of his opportunity to deceive the Mascaros by hastily meeting with the 
Mascaros to obtain their signatures on the listing agreements on a Sunday, when 
Wardley's agent knew that the Mascaros' legal counsel would most likely not be present. 
(R. at 949). The trial court concluded that the listing agreements were fraudulently 
induced and, therefore, Wardley did not have any viable economic relations with the 
Mascaros with which Cannon could interfere. (R. at 951). Wardley never appealed these 
factual findings. 
7. On September 25, 1998, Cannon filed a motion to recover the attorney's 
fees and costs she incurred in defending against Wardley's claims. (R. at 979). On 
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February 9, 2000, the trial court awarded Cannon $2091.45 in costs. (R. at 1393). On 
April 21, 1999, the trial court entered its order denying Cannon's motion for attorneys' 
fees, ruling that "Wardley" was not responsible for the fraudulent conduct of its agent 
because it did not participate in its agent's fraudulent conduct, it did not know its agent 
was engaging in fraudulent conduct, and it did not have reason to know that its agent had 
engaged in fraudulent conduct. (R. at 1265-66) A copy of the trial court's Ruling is 
included at the Addendum as Exhibit 4. 
8. The trial court's April 21, 1999 order denying Cannon's motion for 
attorney's fees was incorporated by reference into the court's Final Order of Judgment 
dated January 11, 2000. (R. at 1359-60). A copy of the trial court's Final Order of 
Judgment is included at the Addendum as Exhibit 5. Cannon appealed to this Court from 
the Final Order of Judgment (R. at 1358-61), which appeal was poured-over to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Cannon did not marshal evidence in its briefing, because the trial 
court's factual findings of fraud by Wardley's agent were unchallenged and accurate. 
9. On February 15, 2001, a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's legal determinations that Wardley should be viewed separately from its fraudulent 
agent, that the agent's knowledge of the fraud should not be imputed to Wardley, and 
thus Wardley was not liable for attorneys' fees under Utah's Bad Faith Statute. A copy 
of the Court of Appeals' opinion is included at the Addendum as Exhibit 6. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
If Wardley's fraudulent agent, Hansen, had been the plaintiff suing Cannon, his 
liability for fees in seeking to enforce a contract he knowingly altered to extend its term 
would be undisputed. But Utah law precluded Hansen from being the plaintiff, and 
instead required his broker, Wardley, to file suit. That is because under Utah's common 
law and statutory scheme, the broker is entitled to the commission and, as the principal, it 
is both responsible for and benefits from its agent's activities. Because Hansen was 
acting as an agent for Wardley at all relevant times, because Wardley stood to share in 
the commission it was seeking by trying to enforce a fraudulent contract, and because 
Utah law does not distinguish between broker and agent in relation to these real property 
dealings, Hansen's knowledge of his fraud should be imputed to his principal, Wardley. 
Thus, this Court should find that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erroneously 
denied Cannon attorneys fees under Utah's Bad Faith Statute. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO SEE NO 
MEANINGFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN HODGES AND THIS 
CASE, AND THUS HANSEN'S ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF HIS 
OWN FRAUD SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPUTED TO WARDLEY. 
In 1991, this Court considered the question of whether the knowledge of an 
employee may be imputed to the employer when the employer pursues claims against a 
person known by the employee to be innocent of the claims. This Court answered that 
question in the affirmative, so long as the employee was acting within the scope of his 
employment and, at least in part, to benefit his employer. In Hodges v. Gibson Products 
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), Gibson's store manager, named Cosgrove, had been 
stealing money from Gibson. There came a point in time when Cosgrove cast blame on 
Hodges, a part-time bookkeeper, and, on behalf of Gibson, Cosgrove went to the police 
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and filed criminal charges against Hodges. Before Hodges was put on trial, the theft by 
Cosgrove came to light, and the charges against Hodges were dropped. In affirming the 
jury verdict against Gibson in the subsequent civil trial for malicious prosecution, this 
Court imputed to Gibson as a matter of law Cosgrove's actual knowledge that Hodges 
was innocent. Thus, Gibson, as the employer, was charged with knowingly pursuing 
false claims against an innocent party. 
In holding Gibson responsible for its agent's knowledge, this Court in Hodges 
relied upon Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 comment c, and articulated the 
following rule of law: 
Thus, the knowledge which Gibson's servants had in 
initiating the malicious prosecution action against Hodges and 
the responsibility for the initiation of the action itself is 
imputed, as a matter of law, to Gibson, if Gibson's servants 
acted within the scope of their authority and were motivated 
either in whole or in part to carry out Gibson's purposes. 
Hodges, at 157. 
Cannon argued to the Court of Appeals that like Gibson, Wardley was pursuing 
claims against an innocent third party, which claims were known to Wardley's agent to 
be false. The panel erred when it attempted to distinguish Hodges from this case by 
characterizing the prosecuting party in Hodges as Cosgrove, not Gibson. "In Hodges, the 
court imputed knowledge of a managerial employee, Cosgrove, to his employer and held 
his employer liable for Cosgrove's intentional malicious prosecution of Hodges." 
Wardley Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon et aL 2001 UT App 48,1 9, 21 P.3d 235, 
239 (emphasis added). Contrary to the panel's statement, Cosgrove did not prosecute 
Hodges. Gibson did. The Court of Appeals' fundamental misunderstanding of the facts 
and meaning of Hodges was error, since it was Gibson with sole standing to pursue the 
claims of theft against Hodges, not Cosgrove. This erroneous distinction lies at the heart 
of, and thus flawed the panel's decision. 
While Cosgrove may have been the live person filing criminal charges against 
Hodges, he was doing so on behalf of and in the name of Gibson. The Court of Appeal's 
confusion between the principal and agent in Hodges mimicked the underlying flaw in 
the trial court's analysis below, by suggesting there is a legal difference between 
principal and agent in these situations. There is not. Cosgrove had no personal claims 
against Hodges. Hodges was not charged with stealing from Cosgrove. Here too, 
Hansen had no personal claims against Cannon. Wardley's fraudulent agent lacked 
standing to bring claims against Cannon.1 Only Wardley had standing to pursue the 
commissions under Utah statute. 
The Court of Appeals' error is repeated in its last paragraph. "There is no legal 
support for [Cannon's] claim that vicarious liability should be applied in a manner that 
imputes the agent's knowledge to the principal to answer for the principal's own actions." 
Id. at [^ 11. Thus, the panel's earlier confusion between agent and principal is continued 
here. Cannon did not seek to have Wardley answer for its "own actions." This logic 
presupposed that Wardley is a live person, with knowledge and actions independent of its 
agents. Yet when the principal is a corporation, as here and in Hodges, the only means of 
1
 That Hansen was Wardley's agent, and that only Wardley had standing to bring the suit 
against Cannon, is undisputed. Utah's statutory scheme requires that Wardley, as the 
broker, pursue the claims of its agents, since it is the broker who is entitled to real estate 
commissions. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-10(1) and 61-2-18(2). 
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taking any action is through agents. Wardley, as a corporation, has no actions of its 
"own." Thus, the knowledge of an agent acting in the scope of his employment, and for 
the benefit of his principal should necessarily be imputed to that principal - here, 
Wardley. 
B. DECADES OF UTAH JURISPRUDENCE SUPPORT APPLICATION 
OF THE HODGES RULE HERE. 
Utah's jurisprudence concerning imputed knowledge and vicarious liability is well 
developed, and its origins precede Statehood: 
It is a general doctrine of law that, although the principal is 
not ordinarily liable (for he sometimes is) in a criminal suit 
for the acts or misdeeds of his agent, unless, indeed, he has 
authorized or co-operated in those acts or misdeeds, yet he is 
held liable to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds, 
deceits, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences, 
and other malfeasances or misfeasances, and omissions of 
duty of his agent in the course of his employment, although 
the principal did not authorize or justify or participate in, or 
indeed know of, such misconduct, or even if he forbade the 
acts or disapproved of them. In all cases the rule applies, 
respondeat superior, and it is founded upon public policy and 
convenience; for in no other way could there be any safety to 
third persons in their dealings, either directly with the 
principal, or indirectly with him, through the instrumentality 
of agents. In every such case the principal holds out his agent 
as competent and fit to be trusted; and thereby, in effect, he 
warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within 
the scope of his agency. 
Everett v. Oregon Short Line & Utah Northern RY. Co.. 9 Utah 340, 346-47, 34 P. 289, 
290 (1893) (quoting Story, Doctrine of Agency, section 452). The Court of Appeals' 
i s\ 
decision below implicitly rejects this doctrine by exonerating Wardley from any 
responsibility for its fraudulent agent's actions and knowledge. 
Utah courts have consistently applied the rule of law which holds that "as between 
two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer through the fraud of third, that the one 
who puts it in the power of the other to practice the fraud must suffer the loss." Swartz v. 
White, 80 Utah 150, 152, 13 P.2d 643, 644 (1932). As between Cannon and Wardley, 
Wardley should answer for its fraudulent agent's conduct and compensate Cannon by 
reimbursing her for her fees. In seeking to get a commission, Hansen was acting to 
benefit Wardley as his principal. Wardley was trying hard to obtain that benefit. It was 
Wardley who put Hansen in the position, and empowered him with the authority, to 
deceive the Mascaros. Thus, too, Wardley put Hansen in the position to fraudulently 
create the contracts upon which Wardley's claims against Cannon were based. It is 
undisputed that Wardley was in a superior, and perhaps the only position to prevent the 
fraud of its own agent. See G. Eugene England Found, v. Smith's Food King, 542 P.2d 
753, 755 (Utah 1975); Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Utah 
1974); Heavy v. The Commercial NatT Bank, 27 Utah 222, 229, 75 P. 727, 729 (1904 ). 
The Court of Appeals ignored these policies in its opinion. Wardley was not a victim 
here. Unless Cannon is reimbursed for the attorney's fees she paid in defending against 
Wardley's claims, then Cannon alone will suffer the financial consequences of Hansen's 
dishonesty. In such circumstances, this Court has uniformly concluded that the burden 
should fall upon Wardley, as "the party that held [Hansen] out and gave him the character 
and standing of an honest man." Sullivan v. Evans-Morris Whitney Co., 54 Utah 293, 
n 
304, 180 P. 435, 439 (1919). This policy should be reaffirmed again here, and this Court 
should reverse the Court of Appeals' decision below. 
C. BECAUSE WARDLEY IS AND SHOULD BE IMPUTED WITH THE 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF ITS 
AGENT, CANNON IS ENTITLED TO BE COMPENSATED FOR 
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES SHE EXPENDED IN DEFENDING 
AGAINST WARDLEY'S MERITLESS CLAIMS, BROUGHT IN 
BAD FAITH. 
Section 78-27-56(1) of the Utah Code requires the court to award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if an action is without merit and brought in bad faith. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1) (1988); Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Sons, 808 
P.2d 1061, 1067 (Utah 1991). Because Wardley is imputed with knowledge of the 
fraudulent nature of its claims against Cannon, this Court should remand this case back to 
the trial court with instructions to determine a reasonable attorneys fee below, and on 
appeal. 
1. Wardley's Claims Were Without Merit 
A claim is without merit if it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance 
having no basis in law or fact." Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). In 
accusing Cannon of converting its property, of violating the ethical standards which 
govern real estate agents, and of interfering with contracts that Wardley's agent 
unlawfully and fraudulently obtained, Wardley asserted defamatory and frivolous claims 
which had no basis in fact or law. Wardley, imputed with the knowledge of its agent, 
knew the contracts at issue were fraudulently obtained. Thus, each of Wardley's claims 
was meritless as a matter of law. 
2. Wardley's Claims Were Brought in Bad Faith 
The Second Amended Complaint was brought in bad faith. A claim is asserted in 
bad faith if, among other things, it is asserted "to take unconscionable advantage of 
others." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. Wardley's case against Cannon was not about collecting 
a debt based on a lawful and binding contract, or even upon a colorable claim of such. 
Rather, this case involved a real estate brokerage that, through its authorized agent, 
altered the material terms of several contracts with Mascaros, and then elected to expand 
the scope of its attack to Cannon, a stranger to the dealings between Mascaros and 
Wardley. This Court should not countenance Wardley's improper attempt to take 
advantage of Cannon in this lawsuit. Instead, this Court should require that Wardley pay 
Cannon the attorneys' fees and costs she has incurred in defending against this action. 
Wardley correctly asserted below that, as a general rule, fraud committed by a 
third party cannot be imputed to another defendant. However, in Jensen v. IHC Hosps., 
Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 338 (Utah 1997), this Court expressly held that "[w]here . . . there is 
an agency or privity relationship between the third party committing the fraud and the 
defendant, our cases indicate that liability for the agent's negligent or intentional tort can 
be imputed to the principal if the agent acts in whole or in part to carry out the purposes 
of the principal. Id. (citing Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 
2
 Attorney's fees are particularly warranted here when, prior to trial, the court expressly 
cautioned Wardley about proceeding with claims against Cannon which, after a diligent 
exploration of the facts, would prove untenable. See Court's Ruling dated October 9, 
1996. (R. at 269.) 
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1991); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989)). This factual 
standard is met here. 
It is not disputed that Wardley's agent acted in bad faith by fraudulently altering 
listing agreements. Moreover, Wardley does not dispute that its agent (1) lacked an 
honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) intended to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) intended to or acted with the knowledge that 
the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998; see Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
Instead, Wardley contends that it should not be required to pay Cannon's attorney's fees 
because "it" was unaware of its own agent's duplicity. This Court should reject such an 
attempt by a principal to insulate itself from the bad acts of its agent, particularly when 
Wardley stood to, and vigorously fought to profit by those bad acts if they were not found 
out and proven at trial. Wardley was imbued with Hansen's knowledge, and thus its 
actions are tainted by that knowledge. 
This Court should not permit Wardley to claim Hansen was its agent for purposes 
of suing on an unpaid commission, and for purposes of collecting that commission and 
other statutory damages if it succeeded in completing its agent's fraud, but suddenly was 
not Wardley's agent when Wardley's commission claim was ultimately found to be based 
on its own agent's fraud. Yet this is the effect of the Court of Appeals' ruling. If such a 
rule were to stand, it would allow all brokerages to reap the benefits of their agents' 
fraudulent and illegal conduct, without any risk or liability for those acts. Such a rule 
would change the landscape of Utah's law of agency. 
Accordingly, because of the agency relationship between Hansen and Wardley, 
Utah law dictates that by reason of Hansen's knowledge in Wardley's bringing frivolous 
claims against Cannon, those claims were necessarily brought in bad faith as a matter of 
law. Wardley's liability, in this case, includes payment of Cannon's attorneys' fees and 
costs incurred in defending against the meritless action Wardley brought in bad faith, and 
incurred on appeal. 
D. BECAUSE THERE WERE NO FACTUAL DISPUTES, IT WAS 
UNNECESSARY FOR CANNON TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE. 
The panel of the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that Cannon failed to 
marshal the evidence and challenge the factual findings supporting the trial court's 
decision. Such failure, reasoned the panel, "is fatal to this appeal." Wardley Better 
Homes and Garden v. Cannon et aL 2001 UT App 48, ^ 7, 21 P.3d 235, 239. This was 
error. 
Specifically, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the trial court made a 
factual finding that "Wardley's suit was not pursued in bad faith." The fraudulent 
conduct of Wardley's agent, as determined by the trial court, and the knowledge that 
arose from that conduct constitute factual findings from which no one appealed. Whether 
the now undisputed fraudulent conduct and knowledge of its agent should be imputed to 
Wardley presents a legal question. Cannon need not marshal evidence on factual findings 
not in dispute. State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App. 106, 999 P.2d 1252 (holding that 
marshaling the evidence "is unnecessary because [defendant] is challenging the trial 
court's legal conclusions rather than its factual findings."). Further, Cannon's decision 
not to marshal the evidence supporting the uncontested facts of this case does not relieve 
this Court of its obligation to '"review . . . the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions 
of law and the application of that law in the case.'" Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 
P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 1997) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)) 
Here, Cannon asks this Court to review conclusions of law and the application of law to 
the uncontested facts and circumstances of this case. 
It is undisputed that the trial court found that Wardley's agent, Hansen, 
fraudulently altered the dates of certain listing agreements and fraudulently induced his 
clients, the Mascaros, to enter into the listing agreements. It is also undisputed that 
Hansen was acting as Wardley's agent when he engaged in this fraudulent conduct. And, 
it is undisputed that in an effort to profit from its agent's conduct, Wardley sued Cannon, 
a stranger to the dealings between Wardley and the Mascaros, to collect a real estate 
commission and obtain treble damages. Accordingly, the only issue before this Court is a 
question of law, i.e., whether Wardley should be deemed to have the same knowledge as 
its agent. Principles of agency and accountability, in particular where fiduciaries are 
concerned, should move this Court to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
instruct the trial court to impose fees against Wardley under the Bad Faith Statute. 
E. THE POLICIES BEHIND THE BAD FAITH STATUTE ARE 
REMUNERATIVE. 
The policies behind the Bad Faith Statute support reversing the Court of Appeals. 
The purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 is primarily remunerative, as it is designed to 
compensate an innocent party for the costs associated with defending meritless claims 
16 
brought in bad faith. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 was promulgated as House Bill 100 
and discussed on February 5, 1991 by the House of Representatives at the 44th Utah 
Legislative General Session. The sponsor of the Bill, Representative Richard L. 
Maxfield, stated that: 
The purpose of this bill is to eliminate vexatious and nuisance 
lawsuits. . . . If [a lawsuit is filed], there is no provision even 
though the suit is later dismissed because it is frivolous, 
without foundation or without merit, there is no basis to 
require that person who brought the suit without foundation to 
pay the cost, the attorney's fees that the party had to pay to 
defend it. That many times people come in, a suit has been 
brought against them without foundation or basis and they 
say, well there's no basis for this. I agree, but you still have 
to file an answer, you have to answer and maybe even file a 
motion to dismiss . . . . But you still will have to get an 
attorney to file that action or unless you can do it yourself. 
Most of them cannot, they have to hire an attorney. Can I 
counterclaim for my attorney's fees? The answer is "No." 
When it is an action such as this, you are just out your own 
attorney's fees. If you can get the action dismissed, that's the 
best you can do. 
Statement of Rep. Maxfield, Third Reading of H.B. 100, 44th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 
5, 1981) (H.R. Recording Tape No. 6, side 1). Thus, the primary purpose of awarding 
attorneys1 fees where the losing party has filed a meritless claim in bad faith is to make 
the innocent party whole by compensating the prevailing party for the legal expenses 
incurred in defending against a groundless suit. If the Court of Appeals' decision is 
allowed to stand, the purpose of the Bad Faith Statute will be frustrated here, and perhaps 
in many future cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' 
opinion affirming the trial court's denial of Cannon's Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs, and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to determine Cannon's 
reasonable attorneys' fees below, and attorney's fees incurred in appealing the trial and 
appellate court's rulings, pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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